The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq
By Darrin Mortenson
Time
Could Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's attempts to re-establish control over Basra backfire? There is a growing possibility that it could become a wider intra-Shi'ite war, drawing in the forces loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose ceasefire has been key to the success of the U.S. "surge"? If so, the consequences for American military strategy in Iraq in an all-important political year will be grave.
Maliki's government targeted Basra because it could. Unlike many other southern cities where fighting has escalated in recent weeks, Maliki has built an independent power base among the security forces there. But Tuesday's sweep of Basra could turn sour in other southern cities where the central government's power is weak. Indeed, many Shi'ites are seeing this not just as an example of the Shi'ite Maliki taking on other Shi'ites (including Sadrists) but of America backing the Prime Minister up in a de facto Shi'a civil war. Iraqi government forces have attacked Shi'ite militias and gangs in at least seven major southern Iraq cities in the past two weeks. And America has been there to support Maliki's troops every time.
In response, Sadr loyalists have already taken to the streets in Baghdad, where U.S. troops will have to deal with the backlash. U.S. officials have so far shied away from blaming Sadr for the recent rise of violence (including an Easter attack on the Green Zone), mostly because Sadr's ceasefire has been key to the success of the surge. (General David Petraeus has pointed the finger at Iran instead.) But as clashes increase, they may not be able to dance around it for much longer.
The violence is escalating as Patraeus, the architect of the nine-month military "surge" involving some 30,000 extra troops in Iraq, prepares for a scheduled Apr. 8 and 9 report to congress on his progress in Iraq. They also come as he and Defense Secretary Robert Gates waffle over whether to withdraw five combat brigades by July, reducing troop levels down from about 158,000 to 140,000 — the pre-surge peak. If the fighting spreads to other southern cities and attacks by Shi'ite militias increase, intra-Shiite violence may be the wrench that jams the whole works of a meaningful reduction of troops.
(Continued here.)
Time
Could Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's attempts to re-establish control over Basra backfire? There is a growing possibility that it could become a wider intra-Shi'ite war, drawing in the forces loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose ceasefire has been key to the success of the U.S. "surge"? If so, the consequences for American military strategy in Iraq in an all-important political year will be grave.
Maliki's government targeted Basra because it could. Unlike many other southern cities where fighting has escalated in recent weeks, Maliki has built an independent power base among the security forces there. But Tuesday's sweep of Basra could turn sour in other southern cities where the central government's power is weak. Indeed, many Shi'ites are seeing this not just as an example of the Shi'ite Maliki taking on other Shi'ites (including Sadrists) but of America backing the Prime Minister up in a de facto Shi'a civil war. Iraqi government forces have attacked Shi'ite militias and gangs in at least seven major southern Iraq cities in the past two weeks. And America has been there to support Maliki's troops every time.
In response, Sadr loyalists have already taken to the streets in Baghdad, where U.S. troops will have to deal with the backlash. U.S. officials have so far shied away from blaming Sadr for the recent rise of violence (including an Easter attack on the Green Zone), mostly because Sadr's ceasefire has been key to the success of the surge. (General David Petraeus has pointed the finger at Iran instead.) But as clashes increase, they may not be able to dance around it for much longer.
The violence is escalating as Patraeus, the architect of the nine-month military "surge" involving some 30,000 extra troops in Iraq, prepares for a scheduled Apr. 8 and 9 report to congress on his progress in Iraq. They also come as he and Defense Secretary Robert Gates waffle over whether to withdraw five combat brigades by July, reducing troop levels down from about 158,000 to 140,000 — the pre-surge peak. If the fighting spreads to other southern cities and attacks by Shi'ite militias increase, intra-Shiite violence may be the wrench that jams the whole works of a meaningful reduction of troops.
(Continued here.)
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