Second Marine Expeditionary Force's March report from Anbar province

(Source commentary: This seems to be conventional COIN [counterinsurgency] doctrine, but considering where we've come from in the Rumsfeld era it sounds like progress. Either the lads figured it out for themselves, or the new joint USMC/USA doctrine has been accepted and is being implemented.)

March 2008
II MEF (Fwd)/ MNF-W 06-08, G-2
13 Bullets on the Insurgency in Anbar

1. Population control measures have been critical in securing the urban centers. They separate the insurgent from the people and without access to the people the insurgency will die. Techniques such as berming, the execution of limited, sequenced, clearing operations that clear a population center district by district, the subsequent backfill with trained Iraqi Police in each neighborhood, limited movement of vehicle traffic thru established ECPs, and census, badging, and biometric operations make it extremely difficult for insurgent elements to operate within the population center. Operations in Ramadi in the spring of 2007 and Fallujah in the summer demonstrated the effectiveness of these techniques. Violence in Ramadi dropped from approximately 160 enemy incidents per week to 5, and Fallujah dropped from the mid 60's to less than 5 per week as well, with the majority of these incidents consisting of IED finds vice active attacks.

2. The insurgency is like a shark, it has to move to survive, cut off its freedom of movement and it loses its effectiveness. The insurgent has to be able to move to generate revenue, to re-supply, to recruit, to intimidate the population, to disseminate propaganda, and to undertake any of the other essential tasks required to be effective. The establishment of Battle Positions, Combat Outposts, Vehicle Check Points, and canalizing the enemy's movement along specific routes has been an effective technique for denying the enemy freedom of movement.

3. Population control measures and the subsequent movement of the insurgency into more remote areas has a secondary positive effect on our operations. More and more often, we find ourselves engaging the enemy on terrain that maximizes kinetic effects. Instead of engaging the enemy in the Jolan in Fallujah or Malaab in Ramadi, we have now shaped an environment where we can engage him in areas with negligible collateral damage impacts and the subsequent, associated IO risks involved with operations on urban terrain. 1/3 BCT's engagement of extremist elements attempting to infiltrate Ramadi from the remote areas surrounding Lake Habbaniyah 30 June-1 July 2007 is a classic example of engaging the enemy on terrain of this type. 1/3 BCT was able to kill 40 insurgents during the engagement utilizing the full spectrum of kinetic effects to include fixed and rotary wing CAS, artillery and direct fire weapons systems.

4. Locally recruited, trained and employed Iraqi Police (IP) are critical to success. They are the most feared security force in the eyes of the insurgency. Coalition Force's (CF) ability to correctly identify insurgent elements from within the population has never been good. Locally employed IPs have an inherent ability to correct that deficiency. They operate in tribal areas that they have lived in all their lives and have access to familial and tribal humint networks historically unavailable to Coalition Forces. The fact that they live within their tribal areas gives them a level of personal security that makes them difficult to target as well.

5. The insurgent will move away from pressure, but only as far as required to maintain his viability. He will be reticent to abandon caches, revenue streams, safe houses and facilitation routes. The GCE has done a tremendous job anticipating the enemy's next move and sequencing operations in order to drive the enemy from the area of operations. The corollary to this paragraph is offered below.

6. If you displace from an area, the insurgency will back fill behind you and the next time you operate in that area cooperation will be more difficult. Increased ISF force levels in the last year have mitigated this problem significantly in that CF can usually back fill with an ISF elements into a recently cleared area. However, in some areas such as Muthana and Lake Thar Thar, insurgent elements continue to backfill into recently vacated areas and contest us for control.

7. In addition to denying the insurgency freedom of movement, the second tactical imperative for defeating it is to deny the insurgent anonymity within the population. Local indigenous sources, informants, and IA and IP developed humint subsource networks are vital in order to identify insurgent elements operating within the population. The shifting of tribal allegiances away from AQI and to CF and the GOI has given us insights into the insurgency previously unavailable. In previous tours we have seen the negative consequences of mass detainment based on our inability to properly discriminate between insurgents and those simply caught at the wrong place at the wrong time. Selective detainments based on precise intelligence helps build faith in the ISF and CF.

8. Biometrics and Forensics are critical aspects in denying the insurgent the anonymity he requires. Biometrics and forensics should be "commander's business" as they straddle many of the traditional staff functions. The high quality enrollment of over 400,000 Anbaris within BATS, consisting of a variety of personal and biometric data to include 10 digit fingerprints and Iris scans, has been critical in separating the insurgent from the population. The execution of disciplined sensitive site exploitation, to include the proper handling of evidence that may be exploited forensically, has also been a critical tool in determining the identity of our adversary. Biometric enrollment sufficient to build a quality database takes time. SSE training takes away from time that can be spent on other tactical training tasks. The time MNF-W has spent "tilling the soil" in these two areas, however, is now bearing fruit against our adversary and our biometrics capabilities probably poses the greatest threat to the insurgent's ability to operate within the province.

9. Anbar is contiguous battle space for the insurgency and he will use our boundary seams against us. Nowhere has this proven more true at than in the areas to our northeast and east, where we face our most determined resistance along boundary seams with other Multi National Divisions (MND). The enemy recognizes where uniforms and patches change, where patrols turnaround and which units are conducting tribal engagements in a given area. We can cite countless examples of insurgent vehicles moving from MND battle space into MNF-W and dropping insurgents off at various locations, using cross boundary points of origin for indirect fire, etc. Without close coordination between adjacent units to shut down seam areas, they will continue to be used as safe havens.

10. HVI targeting is most effective when the insurgency has lost popular support. Over the last three and a half years, many analysts have consistently proclaimed that we were dismantling the insurgency through HVI targeting, but it simply wasn't the case. The insurgency showed an amazing ability to regenerate leadership between 2003 and 2006. Admittedly we did see some temporary degradation on occasion in specific geographic areas, but we never achieved long term effects by targeting individuals that we assessed as being critical to the insurgency. However, this dynamic may be changing. We are beginning to see indications of recruiting difficulties, a younger, smaller and less experienced insurgent base, and defections and splintering within some groups. A word of caution, however. There comes a cross over point against the insurgency when the use of national level special operations forces, such as OCF-I, becomes a greater risk to your counterinsurgency strategy than it is a benefit. We may be reaching that point in Anbar. We have had several incidents over the course of the year where the collateral damage caused by these counter terrorist operations damaged our counterinsurgency strategy. The counter terrorist and counterinsurgency strategy are not synonymous and the balance between kinetic operations and other methodologies needs to be carefully managed.

11. We will never kill or capture large numbers of insurgents with ground based sweeps of open desert areas. Our requirement for route clearance, extremely slow speeds due to the IED threat, and large numbers of tactical vehicles, easily identifiable at long distances, ensures that "4 insurgents in an Opel" will escape every time. We have consistently found VBIEDS, IED making facilities, and caches, many recently abandoned, but our operational construct almost ensures that we will never catch individuals who have used the desert as a refugee and transit route for a thousand years. Perhaps a better tactic is to occupy terrain and facilities important to the insurgency, initially driving them from the area, but then interdicting them on their return utilizing indigenous humint networks and security forces augmented with biometric tools. Patient, persistent, presence seems to consistently pay larger dividends than battalion and company level maneuver.

12. Kill and capture operations are the long way home. While kinetic operations have a temporary positive effect on the local security situation, unless we deal with the core Sunni grievances of disenfranchisement, a lack of economic opportunity, and a perception of foreign occupation, long term success will be elusive. Basic services must be restored, economic opportunity other than carrying a weapon provided, and the people must feel that they have stake in their government for a return to normalcy to occur.

13. While the insurgency may very well be defeated, we are entering into a period of inter-communal competition that may threaten stability. The improved security situation has loosened the bonds formed between the tribes in the fight against Al Qaeda. Competition for political power, tribal influence, and economic advantage has overtaken security as the most pressing concern with Anbaris. We may not be able to manage this dynamic as our participation in this dialogue will usually appear to favor one party and aggrieve the others. Life continues to be a zero sum game for the Iraqis. Impartially guiding and mentoring a culture we don't completely understand to make decisions within the framework of a free market economy, democratic principles, and a western justice system, will continue to be one of our greatest challenges.