Though less in the news, Iraq is still there
Five myths about Iraq:
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, a senior correspondent and associate editor at The Washington Post, is the author of “Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan” and “Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone.”
Ten years ago, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the assumptions many Americans held about the coming war, fed by rhetoric from the George W. Bush White House, turned out to be wildly inaccurate. Saddam Hussein, as we now know, did not possess weapons of mass destruction. The conflict would not end quickly. And the cost of the war — in lives and dollars — would far eclipse expectations. Today, a new set of beliefs defines many discussions about the war and its aftermath. Are they just as wrong?
1. The troop surge succeeded.
The surge of 26,000 troops into Baghdad in 2007 had two objectives: tamp down the bloody sectarian civil war and forge a political compromise among the three principal groups in Iraqi society — Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs and ethnic Kurds — that would set the country on a path to stability.
The surge helped accomplish the first goal, but it was not the only reason for the reduced violence. A decision by Sunni tribal leaders to oppose al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq also played a major role. So, too, did Iraqi behavior; as mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad became more homogeneous and fortified, opportunities for sectarian violence decreased.
(More here.)
- The troop surge succeeded.
- Iraq today is relatively peaceful.
- Iraq is a democracy.
- Iraq is in Iran’s pocket.
- The Americans have all left.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, a senior correspondent and associate editor at The Washington Post, is the author of “Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan” and “Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone.”
Ten years ago, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the assumptions many Americans held about the coming war, fed by rhetoric from the George W. Bush White House, turned out to be wildly inaccurate. Saddam Hussein, as we now know, did not possess weapons of mass destruction. The conflict would not end quickly. And the cost of the war — in lives and dollars — would far eclipse expectations. Today, a new set of beliefs defines many discussions about the war and its aftermath. Are they just as wrong?
1. The troop surge succeeded.
The surge of 26,000 troops into Baghdad in 2007 had two objectives: tamp down the bloody sectarian civil war and forge a political compromise among the three principal groups in Iraqi society — Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs and ethnic Kurds — that would set the country on a path to stability.
The surge helped accomplish the first goal, but it was not the only reason for the reduced violence. A decision by Sunni tribal leaders to oppose al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq also played a major role. So, too, did Iraqi behavior; as mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad became more homogeneous and fortified, opportunities for sectarian violence decreased.
(More here.)
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