Setting the record straight
Five myths about the bin Laden raid
By Mark Bowden, WashPost, Published: October 19
1. The decision to launch the raid was a close call.
Not really. The idea that Obama bucked the counsel of his key advisers in ordering the Navy SEAL assault on bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan apparently arose from reports of the spirited discussions the president held in the weeks before the raid. Vice President Biden’s national security adviser, Tony Blinken, was quoted by CNN as saying: “First, we [didn’t] know for sure bin Laden [was] there; the evidence [was] circumstantial. Second, most of his most senior advisers had recommended a different course of action.”
By the time of their final meeting three days before the raid, nearly all the principals favored sending in the SEALs, according to interviews I conducted. The biggest exception was Biden, who wanted more time to make certain bin Laden was present. However, the president had accepted months earlier that the chance that the al-Qaeda chief was at the compound was essentially 50-50.
Obama’s advisers did provide him alternatives to a direct assault. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, James Cartwright, favored launching a small missile from a drone at “the Pacer” — their term for the tall man who was often seen walking within the compound walls. This carried a greater risk of missing the target but a much lower risk than sending a SEAL team into Pakistan. Gates later changed his mind about the drone strike, but by that time Obama had authorized the raid.
Support for the raid also went well beyond the principals and included the CIA, National Counterterrorism Center officials and the National Security Council staff.
(More here.)
1. The decision to launch the raid was a close call.
Not really. The idea that Obama bucked the counsel of his key advisers in ordering the Navy SEAL assault on bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan apparently arose from reports of the spirited discussions the president held in the weeks before the raid. Vice President Biden’s national security adviser, Tony Blinken, was quoted by CNN as saying: “First, we [didn’t] know for sure bin Laden [was] there; the evidence [was] circumstantial. Second, most of his most senior advisers had recommended a different course of action.”
By the time of their final meeting three days before the raid, nearly all the principals favored sending in the SEALs, according to interviews I conducted. The biggest exception was Biden, who wanted more time to make certain bin Laden was present. However, the president had accepted months earlier that the chance that the al-Qaeda chief was at the compound was essentially 50-50.
Obama’s advisers did provide him alternatives to a direct assault. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, James Cartwright, favored launching a small missile from a drone at “the Pacer” — their term for the tall man who was often seen walking within the compound walls. This carried a greater risk of missing the target but a much lower risk than sending a SEAL team into Pakistan. Gates later changed his mind about the drone strike, but by that time Obama had authorized the raid.
Support for the raid also went well beyond the principals and included the CIA, National Counterterrorism Center officials and the National Security Council staff.
(More here.)
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