The Yen’s Lesson for the Yuan
By JOSEPH A. MASSEY and LEE M. SANDS
NYT
AMONG the many points of tension between the United States and China, perhaps the single greatest one concerns exchange rates. For more than a decade, Beijing has kept the value of the renminbi, also known as the yuan, more or less constant to the dollar, a strategy that critics say increases the price of American exports to China and fuels the rapidly growing trade deficit with Beijing.
Despite its decision to let the yuan rise 21 percent against the dollar between 2005 and 2008, China has remained a favorite target of Congress. Democrats and Republicans have consistently called for punitive action against China, including sanctions on imports, unless it completely de-links the two currencies.
Lost in the noise, however, is the question of whether de-linkage would actually have any effect on the trade deficit. On this, the United States’ 40-year history of pressuring Japan to let the yen appreciate against the dollar is instructive. It indicates that de-linking the yuan would make barely a dent in America’s trade deficit. Luckily, this history also points to a different, more effective way for the United States to benefit from China’s economic growth.
The Japanese story began in August 1971 when, with the American economy under strong inflationary pressure, President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard, letting its value fall.
(More here.)
NYT
AMONG the many points of tension between the United States and China, perhaps the single greatest one concerns exchange rates. For more than a decade, Beijing has kept the value of the renminbi, also known as the yuan, more or less constant to the dollar, a strategy that critics say increases the price of American exports to China and fuels the rapidly growing trade deficit with Beijing.
Despite its decision to let the yuan rise 21 percent against the dollar between 2005 and 2008, China has remained a favorite target of Congress. Democrats and Republicans have consistently called for punitive action against China, including sanctions on imports, unless it completely de-links the two currencies.
Lost in the noise, however, is the question of whether de-linkage would actually have any effect on the trade deficit. On this, the United States’ 40-year history of pressuring Japan to let the yen appreciate against the dollar is instructive. It indicates that de-linking the yuan would make barely a dent in America’s trade deficit. Luckily, this history also points to a different, more effective way for the United States to benefit from China’s economic growth.
The Japanese story began in August 1971 when, with the American economy under strong inflationary pressure, President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard, letting its value fall.
(More here.)
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