Afghanistan is a catastrophe. But we will have to wait for a new Chilcot to admit it
Our leaders would rather avoid embarrassment than be honest about the horrific futility of the wars we are fighting
Simon Jenkins
The Guardian
As British troops retreat from the fortress of Sangin in south Afghanistan, a sleepy room in Westminster again plays host to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war. The British establishment is strangely dotty. Chilcot is like reviewing Passchendaele during the Battle of Britain, or Boudicca's charioteering after the charge of the Light Brigade. American congressmen tear their generals apart when fighting stupid wars. The British prefer to avoid embarrassment.
Sangin should now, after three years of "hearts and minds", be safe in the hands of Afghan army and police units. It is not, any more than is the rest of Helmand, the province allotted to British troops to pacify in summer 2006. Instead it is a forward operating base under perpetual siege, one that the Americans must abandon to the enemy or defend at battalion strength.
The Helmand fiasco was both predictable and predicted. When I (and others) spoke to the Nato commander, General David Richards, in Kabul in early June 2006, his blithe self-confidence was unnerving. He was about to implement the order of the then defence secretary, John Reid, to send 3,000 British troops south to "establish the preconditions for nation-building". Richards was dismissive of such US operations as Enduring Freedom and Mountain Thrust. They just bombed villages and recruited Taliban. He promised to win hearts and minds by "creating Malayan inkspots".
His listeners were incredulous. Had he heard or read nothing of the Pashtun Taliban, of their reputation as insurgents and their obsession with fighting anyone and everyone? We were airily waved aside as whingeing no-hopers. Britain would triumph because "the Afghans basically hate the Taliban". This was the time of Reid's notorious "not a shot fired" remark. It led to a woeful lack of troops, armoured cars and helicopters, and an appalling attrition rate of one in four soldiers killed or wounded.
(More here.)
Simon Jenkins
The Guardian
As British troops retreat from the fortress of Sangin in south Afghanistan, a sleepy room in Westminster again plays host to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war. The British establishment is strangely dotty. Chilcot is like reviewing Passchendaele during the Battle of Britain, or Boudicca's charioteering after the charge of the Light Brigade. American congressmen tear their generals apart when fighting stupid wars. The British prefer to avoid embarrassment.
Sangin should now, after three years of "hearts and minds", be safe in the hands of Afghan army and police units. It is not, any more than is the rest of Helmand, the province allotted to British troops to pacify in summer 2006. Instead it is a forward operating base under perpetual siege, one that the Americans must abandon to the enemy or defend at battalion strength.
The Helmand fiasco was both predictable and predicted. When I (and others) spoke to the Nato commander, General David Richards, in Kabul in early June 2006, his blithe self-confidence was unnerving. He was about to implement the order of the then defence secretary, John Reid, to send 3,000 British troops south to "establish the preconditions for nation-building". Richards was dismissive of such US operations as Enduring Freedom and Mountain Thrust. They just bombed villages and recruited Taliban. He promised to win hearts and minds by "creating Malayan inkspots".
His listeners were incredulous. Had he heard or read nothing of the Pashtun Taliban, of their reputation as insurgents and their obsession with fighting anyone and everyone? We were airily waved aside as whingeing no-hopers. Britain would triumph because "the Afghans basically hate the Taliban". This was the time of Reid's notorious "not a shot fired" remark. It led to a woeful lack of troops, armoured cars and helicopters, and an appalling attrition rate of one in four soldiers killed or wounded.
(More here.)
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