A Great Read....
The day the general made a misstep
By Mark Perry
Asia Times
Dec. 10, 2009
President Barack Obama's national address last Tuesday not only detailed the United States' strategy on Afghanistan, it laid bare his new administration's strengths and weaknesses - and confirmed the growing suspicion that, eight years after September 11, 2001, meeting America's global challenges with a military response remains the default position of the Washington policymaking establishment.
"Don't underestimate the impact that eight years of the [George W] Bush administration has had in Washington," a senior State Department official explained this last summer. "The Bush people set out the language of the war on terrorism, invented the vocabulary, defined the terms. People talk about the importance of 'doing' diplomacy, but no one really knows what that means or how tough it can really be."
At least initially, this assessment seemed contradicted by the administration's flurry of diplomatic activity. Its first months were taken up by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's globetrotting, special envoy George Mitchell's high-profile Jerusalem meetings, AfPak specialist Richard Holbrooke's repeated initiatives with Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari - and Obama's decision to engage Iran in direct talks about its nuclear program.
Suddenly, surprisingly, the military seemed relegated to playing a minor role in Washington: Bush's hero David Petraeus, the US commander for the greater Middle East, was no longer in the headlines, the war in Iraq seemed well in hand and Defense Secretary Robert Gates was nowhere to be seen.
All of this changed in May, when a series of well-timed Taliban offensives led to a spike in US casualties and Gates decided to replace the US Afghan commander, David McKiernan, with Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal. The change did not come as a surprise to Pentagon officers, who had watched Petraeus and McKiernan struggle through a difficult relationship: "The two couldn't be in the same room together," a McKiernan aide says. "We knew there'd be a fist fight if we left them alone." The disagreement was personal: McKiernan resented answering to an officer whom he had once commanded and viewed as politically ambitious.
But the relationship was also scarred by a subtle disagreement over how to meet the Taliban challenge. Both McKiernan and Petraeus agreed that the Taliban posed a security challenge to the Afghan government, but McKiernan focused first on development - on building what he called "human capital". Petraeus disagreed: you can't build "human capital" without security, he argued, and the security situation in the country was deteriorating. Then too, Petraeus thought, what was needed in Afghanistan was an officer who could respond creatively to what Petraeus believed was turning into an asymmetric fight - and McKiernan was an officer with a deep background in running conventional wars.
(Continued here.)
By Mark Perry
Asia Times
Dec. 10, 2009
President Barack Obama's national address last Tuesday not only detailed the United States' strategy on Afghanistan, it laid bare his new administration's strengths and weaknesses - and confirmed the growing suspicion that, eight years after September 11, 2001, meeting America's global challenges with a military response remains the default position of the Washington policymaking establishment.
"Don't underestimate the impact that eight years of the [George W] Bush administration has had in Washington," a senior State Department official explained this last summer. "The Bush people set out the language of the war on terrorism, invented the vocabulary, defined the terms. People talk about the importance of 'doing' diplomacy, but no one really knows what that means or how tough it can really be."
At least initially, this assessment seemed contradicted by the administration's flurry of diplomatic activity. Its first months were taken up by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's globetrotting, special envoy George Mitchell's high-profile Jerusalem meetings, AfPak specialist Richard Holbrooke's repeated initiatives with Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari - and Obama's decision to engage Iran in direct talks about its nuclear program.
Suddenly, surprisingly, the military seemed relegated to playing a minor role in Washington: Bush's hero David Petraeus, the US commander for the greater Middle East, was no longer in the headlines, the war in Iraq seemed well in hand and Defense Secretary Robert Gates was nowhere to be seen.
All of this changed in May, when a series of well-timed Taliban offensives led to a spike in US casualties and Gates decided to replace the US Afghan commander, David McKiernan, with Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal. The change did not come as a surprise to Pentagon officers, who had watched Petraeus and McKiernan struggle through a difficult relationship: "The two couldn't be in the same room together," a McKiernan aide says. "We knew there'd be a fist fight if we left them alone." The disagreement was personal: McKiernan resented answering to an officer whom he had once commanded and viewed as politically ambitious.
But the relationship was also scarred by a subtle disagreement over how to meet the Taliban challenge. Both McKiernan and Petraeus agreed that the Taliban posed a security challenge to the Afghan government, but McKiernan focused first on development - on building what he called "human capital". Petraeus disagreed: you can't build "human capital" without security, he argued, and the security situation in the country was deteriorating. Then too, Petraeus thought, what was needed in Afghanistan was an officer who could respond creatively to what Petraeus believed was turning into an asymmetric fight - and McKiernan was an officer with a deep background in running conventional wars.
(Continued here.)
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