Media: Why supporting the Iraq War was the smart career move
Michael Hastings
The Hastings Report
Writing in “Democracy: A Journal of Ideas,” former Council on Foreign Relations chief Les Gelb slaps the print media on the wrist for getting the Iraq war wrong. After studying 576 news and opinion pieces from the three major newspapers and two major newsweeklies, Gelb says that “the elite press did not embarrass itself to the degree widely assumed–nor did it distinguish itself.” But, he adds, “[f]or the most part, the elite press conveyed [Bush] Administration pronouncements and rationale without much critical commentary.” He goes through the familiar media failings, from pre-invasion suckerhood to Mission Accomplished to the oversimplification of The Surge narrative. Gelb then says the elite print media, “centurions of our democracy,” deserve the same scrutiny we’d give “major government policies and actions.”
All well and good. So why did the media get it wrong? Gelb pins it on “structural problems” in the way news is reported–like giving heft to daily presidential pronouncements and emphasizing politics over policy. Or–and this is a biggy!–”lack of substantive knowledge.” (A polite way to say that lots of war supporters in DC and New York didn’t really have a clue about Iraq, or the nature of war, for that matter. But that didn’t stop any of them from writing with the veneer of authority.)
Those are all factors, sure. But one of the major overlooked reasons of why journos and pundits were so willing to embrace the Iraq War had nothing to do with “print media” as a faceless institution. It came down to individuals, with faces, bylines, and column inches. It didn’t even have much to do with ideology. It had to do with getting ahead.
Supporting the Iraq War was the smart career move, the savvy play.
(More here.)
The Hastings Report
Writing in “Democracy: A Journal of Ideas,” former Council on Foreign Relations chief Les Gelb slaps the print media on the wrist for getting the Iraq war wrong. After studying 576 news and opinion pieces from the three major newspapers and two major newsweeklies, Gelb says that “the elite press did not embarrass itself to the degree widely assumed–nor did it distinguish itself.” But, he adds, “[f]or the most part, the elite press conveyed [Bush] Administration pronouncements and rationale without much critical commentary.” He goes through the familiar media failings, from pre-invasion suckerhood to Mission Accomplished to the oversimplification of The Surge narrative. Gelb then says the elite print media, “centurions of our democracy,” deserve the same scrutiny we’d give “major government policies and actions.”
All well and good. So why did the media get it wrong? Gelb pins it on “structural problems” in the way news is reported–like giving heft to daily presidential pronouncements and emphasizing politics over policy. Or–and this is a biggy!–”lack of substantive knowledge.” (A polite way to say that lots of war supporters in DC and New York didn’t really have a clue about Iraq, or the nature of war, for that matter. But that didn’t stop any of them from writing with the veneer of authority.)
Those are all factors, sure. But one of the major overlooked reasons of why journos and pundits were so willing to embrace the Iraq War had nothing to do with “print media” as a faceless institution. It came down to individuals, with faces, bylines, and column inches. It didn’t even have much to do with ideology. It had to do with getting ahead.
Supporting the Iraq War was the smart career move, the savvy play.
(More here.)
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