How to Deal With a Dictator

North Korea’s recent nuclear test is the regime’s latest act of dangerous defiance. This time around, a new, tougher response is needed.

By ROBERT JOSEPH
WSJ

Once again the Dear Leader has defied the international community with a nuclear test—this time reportedly successful and with a yield that some assess to be equal to that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and ended the Second World War. Once again, headlines around the globe have recorded the condemnation by world leaders. Once again, the Security Council has convened in emergency session to deal with this “grave threat to peace and security.” Once again, the American president has led the chorus, stressing the recklessness of Pyongyang’s action and warning that this provocation will lead to further isolation. Once again, there is talk of “pressuring” North Korea and ensuring that there are “consequences,” but with few specifics offered. And once again, all are agreed, the solution lies in re-convening the Six Party Talks, the negotiating forum created by the Bush Administration to bring together the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas with the goal of eliminating the North’s nuclear programs.

We can predict what will almost certainly follow. The Security Council will, at best, adopt another resolution that won’t be implemented; Russia and China, while expressing “outrage,” will call for a “balanced” approach; the U.S. Special Envoy on North Korea will speak at every opportunity about the need to resume the Talks while the State Department regional bureau will work over time to give Pyongyang what it wants in exchange for returning to the negotiations. For its part, when it determines that it has gone far enough, North Korea may offer a gesture of “good will,” such as freeing the two captive journalists after their show trial for “hostile acts.” And in time, the North will likely pause its reprocessing campaign, perhaps when it runs out of spent fuel rods. The United States will then provide oil and other assistance to get the North back. But back to normal means Pyongyang will be paid even more to stay at the table, while all the time resisting meaningful constraints on its nuclear programs. And then there will be another walk out, another crisis, and the process will start again. I know the playbook, having several times seen the sequence of events unfold from positions in the White House and State Department under President George W. Bush and earlier in a number of policy offices at the Pentagon.

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