The Winnable War
By DAVID BROOKS
NYT
Khyber Pass, Afghanistan
I came to Afghanistan skeptical of American efforts to transform this country. Afghanistan is one of the poorest, least-educated and most-corrupt nations on earth. It is an infinitely complex and fractured society. It has powerful enemies in Pakistan, Iran and the drug networks working hard to foment chaos. The ground is littered with the ruins of great powers that tried to change this place.
Moreover, we simply do not know how to modernize nations. Western aid workers seem to spend most of their time drawing up flow charts for each other. They’re so worried about their inspectors general that they can’t really immerse themselves in the messy world of local reality. They insist on making most of the spending decisions themselves so the “recipients” of their largess end up passive, dependent and resentful.
Every element of my skepticism was reinforced during a six-day tour of the country. Yet the people who work here make an overwhelming case that Afghanistan can become a functional, terror-fighting society and that it is worth sending our sons and daughters into danger to achieve this.
(More here.)
Here's a contrary opinion from someone who has more experience on the ground:
Rethink the Afghanistan surge
A US general explains why the Iraq model doesn't apply.
By Eric T. Olson
CS Monitor
from the March 17, 2009 edition
Honolulu - With great expectations on their shoulders, the first US troops of a 17,000-strong surge are headed to Afghanistan.
But to do what?
Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has admitted that these soldiers are being sent without a clear strategy. Several missions have been proposed to turn back a Taliban resurgence. How will 17,000 more troops accomplish any one of them – let alone all?
The beefed-up effort has been fueled by the belief that the successful surge in Iraq can be replicated in Afghanistan.
It can't.
(Continued here.)
NYT
Khyber Pass, Afghanistan
I came to Afghanistan skeptical of American efforts to transform this country. Afghanistan is one of the poorest, least-educated and most-corrupt nations on earth. It is an infinitely complex and fractured society. It has powerful enemies in Pakistan, Iran and the drug networks working hard to foment chaos. The ground is littered with the ruins of great powers that tried to change this place.
Moreover, we simply do not know how to modernize nations. Western aid workers seem to spend most of their time drawing up flow charts for each other. They’re so worried about their inspectors general that they can’t really immerse themselves in the messy world of local reality. They insist on making most of the spending decisions themselves so the “recipients” of their largess end up passive, dependent and resentful.
Every element of my skepticism was reinforced during a six-day tour of the country. Yet the people who work here make an overwhelming case that Afghanistan can become a functional, terror-fighting society and that it is worth sending our sons and daughters into danger to achieve this.
(More here.)
Here's a contrary opinion from someone who has more experience on the ground:
Rethink the Afghanistan surge
A US general explains why the Iraq model doesn't apply.
By Eric T. Olson
CS Monitor
from the March 17, 2009 edition
Honolulu - With great expectations on their shoulders, the first US troops of a 17,000-strong surge are headed to Afghanistan.
But to do what?
Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has admitted that these soldiers are being sent without a clear strategy. Several missions have been proposed to turn back a Taliban resurgence. How will 17,000 more troops accomplish any one of them – let alone all?
The beefed-up effort has been fueled by the belief that the successful surge in Iraq can be replicated in Afghanistan.
It can't.
(Continued here.)
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