Same People, Same Threat
News Analysis
By SCOTT SHANE
New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 17 — Nearly six years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives expended in the name of the war on terror pose a single, insistent question: Are we safer?
On Tuesday, in a dark and strikingly candid two pages, the nation’s intelligence agencies offered an implicit answer, and it was not encouraging. In many respects, the National Intelligence Estimate suggests, the threat of terrorist violence against the United States is growing worse, fueled by the Iraq war and spreading Islamic extremism.
The conclusions were not new, echoing the private comments of government officials and independent experts for many months. But the stark declassified summary contrasted sharply with the more positive emphasis of President Bush and his top aides for years: that two-thirds of Al Qaeda’s leadership had been killed or captured; that the Iraq invasion would reduce the terrorist menace; and that the United States had its enemies “on the run,” as Mr. Bush has frequently put it.
After years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq and targeted killings in Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere, the major threat to the United States has the same name and the same basic look as in 2001: Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri, plotting attacks from mountain hide-outs near the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The headline on the intelligence estimate, said Daniel L. Byman, a former intelligence officer and the director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, might just as well have been the same as on the now famous presidential brief of Aug. 6, 2001: “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.”
(Continued here.)
By SCOTT SHANE
New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 17 — Nearly six years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives expended in the name of the war on terror pose a single, insistent question: Are we safer?
On Tuesday, in a dark and strikingly candid two pages, the nation’s intelligence agencies offered an implicit answer, and it was not encouraging. In many respects, the National Intelligence Estimate suggests, the threat of terrorist violence against the United States is growing worse, fueled by the Iraq war and spreading Islamic extremism.
The conclusions were not new, echoing the private comments of government officials and independent experts for many months. But the stark declassified summary contrasted sharply with the more positive emphasis of President Bush and his top aides for years: that two-thirds of Al Qaeda’s leadership had been killed or captured; that the Iraq invasion would reduce the terrorist menace; and that the United States had its enemies “on the run,” as Mr. Bush has frequently put it.
After years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq and targeted killings in Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere, the major threat to the United States has the same name and the same basic look as in 2001: Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri, plotting attacks from mountain hide-outs near the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The headline on the intelligence estimate, said Daniel L. Byman, a former intelligence officer and the director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, might just as well have been the same as on the now famous presidential brief of Aug. 6, 2001: “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.”
(Continued here.)
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Where have we heard these complaints and observations before ?
Increased violence …IEDs and suicide bombings … lack of commitment from the Coalition of the Willing …. extending tours …. trained “police/Army” not ready for independent operation … police corruption … Iran sending munitions … long-term military commitment … recommendation to foster constructive dialogue with Iran … polling of citizens indicate support for insurgency .. military power alone is insufficient … concerned that the Government is not communicating key messages to the public about the purpose of its operations.
These were the conclusions of a report issued by a Government Agency … but there are two critical differences. First the Government called the report “balanced” and the country that was being evaluated was Afghanistan.
The British House of Commons Defense Committee issued a report citing that the Taliban is growing stronger in Afghanistan which prompted this response from Britain's defense minister, Des Browne, who called the report "balanced" and said he also wanted more NATO help. He denied that the situation in Afghanistan had worsened significantly or that British air assets were overstretched.
These are the noteworthy determinations :
5. While we note the assertion made by the MoD that the Taliban does not present a "strategic threat" to security in Afghanistan, we are concerned at reports that violence is increasing and spreading to the relatively peaceful Kabul and the Northern Provinces. We are also concerned about the increased use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 35)
9. Despite the Secretary of State's assurances, we remain deeply concerned that the reluctance of some NATO members to provide troops for the ISAF mission is undermining NATO's credibility and also ISAF operations. In response to our report, the Government should explain its strategy for engaging other NATO Governments in addressing the deficit in the CJSOR. (Paragraph 49)
10. The MoD, in consultation with NATO colleagues, should consider the feasibility of extending the operational tours of key personnel. This would allow sufficient time to build and maintain relationships with Afghans and other key figures in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 51)
11. We note the MoD's assessment that some ANA units are now trained sufficiently to be deployed alongside ISAF troops on operations, but we also note that they are some way off operating independently. (Paragraph 54)
13. We note the widespread concerns about the Afghan National Police reform programme. Police failure and corruption alienate support for the Government of Afghanistan and add to grievances which fuel the insurgency. The formation of a well-trained and disciplined ANP is vital to the long-term security of the country. The Government should work to create a greater coherence to the international effort to establish an effective ANP. (Paragraph 61)
17. We note the role Iran has taken in undertaking development work in Western Afghanistan and welcome Iran's pledge to check the flow of narcotics across its border with Afghanistan. We also note with concern reports that explosives originating from Iran have been used by insurgents in Afghanistan. This underlines the urgent necessity for the West, particularly the US and UK, to foster constructive dialogue, and to build confidence in relationships, with as many parts of the Iranian Government and its offshoots as possible. (Paragraph 75)
20. The UK's mission to bring stability to Helmand will require a long-term military and humanitarian commitment if it is to be successful. We recommend that the Government clarify its planning assumptions for the UK deployment to Afghanistan and state the likely length of the deployment beyond the summer of 2009. (Paragraph 89)
22. The polling conducted by the Senlis Council states that support for the insurgency is on the increase, but the MoD states that the "overwhelming majority" of Afghans continue to support UK troops. (Paragraph 98)
30. The MoD acknowledges that reconstruction and development, rather than military power alone, is the key to winning Afghan hearts and minds in Helmand. After a slow start, it seems that coordination between the military and government departments has improved and development work has begun. The people of Helmand will need to see tangible improvements soon or else ISAF and the UK will lose support for the mission. (Paragraph 127)
33. We are very concerned at the indications of closer links between the Taliban and the narcotics trade. (Paragraph 140)
38. We are concerned that the Government is not communicating key messages to the British public about the purpose of its operations in Afghanistan effectively enough. (Paragraph 154)
Here is the complete Recommendations Section
Hey, there’s a reason why it’s called “A Global War on Terror.” The battle is not Iraq … but extends west from the Middle East through Africa and east to the Far East. The future of Iraq is murky at best, but the battle needs to be in Afghanistan and the neighboring sanctuary in Pakistan.
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