Tim Walz's secret weapon

An interview with Campaign Manager Kerry Greeley

by Leigh Pomeroy

Though Tim Walz had been campaigning for Minnesota's 1st Congressional District (MN1) seat since early 2005, he didn't hire an official campaign manager till March of 2006, when he settled on Kerry Greeley, a former high level staffer on the John Kerry presidential campaign.

It was a bit of a stretch. In the two previous congressional campaigns in MN1, no DFLer had achieved more than 36% of the vote, nor had raised more than $125,000. So how did Ms. Greeley hook up with Walz? What did she see in him and the potential of the district? And what are her overall views on the campaign?

In the final week of 2006, she shared her insights with me via email.

Leigh Pomeroy: Tim Walz scored a stunning upset in Minnesota's 1st Congressional District against 12-year incumbent Gil Gutknecht. You were Tim Walz's campaign manager. You're an East Coaster and a graduate of the Harvard School of Public Policy. How did you get involved with a campaign that seemed to have little chance in rural Minnesota?

Kerry Greeley: Tim and I found each other through an organization called Democratic GAIN. GAIN is a resource for candidates and campaign staff to post jobs and resumes. I was looking for a race that was not on everyone's hot list. This was my first time as a Campaign Manager, and it was important to me to find a race that was winnable, a race that should be won, and one that I would be permitted to run on my own. In the hottest races, the DCCC or powerful consultants run the race, and often a campaign manager is a figurehead who carries out orders from others.

I interviewed candidates all over the country. I chose MN1 because the numbers showed that this was a truly 50-50 district — it could be won. I felt that Gutknecht should be beaten, and that Tim Walz would do a better job. And no one in the country was paying attention to this race — it was not on anyone's list of possible upsets. I would not have to fight for control. Tim and I were a good fit, because he is willing to delegate authority — we were always clear that in order for him to be the best candidate he could be, he needed to let me manage the race. This race was a real long shot, but we all believed that with hard work, good luck and smart decisions we would win — and we did.

LP: So Democratic GAIN really works, huh? Who contacted whom first? What in your background attracted you to Tim? Did Tim consider anyone else?

KG: Tim contacted me. I thought we were a good fit for the reasons above, and I thought my fundraising background would enable me to help where he was weakest. He got resumes from people all over the country, but the people that applied had far less experience. He offered me the job over the phone — actually, Gwen did — but I insisted on an interview. I came out in February so we could meet each other, and we both felt we would make a good team.

LP: Fundraising was key, and it's perhaps the least favorite activity a candidate wants to pursue. How did you get Tim to sit down all those days for all those hours to make all those phone calls? Did you try anything unique or different in terms of fundraising? Anything in particular work best?

KG: Tim and I had the discussion about fundraising when I came out to interview for the job. I told him that the only way we could be successful is if we raised enough money to get our message out. The only way we would have that money is if he made the calls. Like everyone else, he hated it, but he had accepted the mission, and he did it.

During my February visit he'd had a fundraiser at Mike Erlandson's house with Al Franken. Al and his wife Franni had not yet contributed. I asked Tim to call Al and ask for $18,400. $10,000 of that was from the Midwest Values PAC. The rest was a personal contribution from Al and Franni — $2100 each for both the primary and the general election. Tim looked at me like I was nuts — he'd never asked for more than $100 per call. He did it anyway, and Al and Franni said yes. Tim was astounded. Most days were not that good, but the few that were really helped.

LP: Okay, let's move to issues. What resonated with voters? Was there an issue that surprised you? That is, was there an issue that you expected to be key and was not, or vice versa?

KG: DM&E Railroad resonated with very active voters in the east, where we beat Gil where he lives. It did not hurt us in the west — we made our number there. Iraq resonated with all voters. Polling showed that voters did not care about corruption in Washington. Republicans and Democrats alike cared that single party power caused an arrogance that led to bad decisions.

LP: Not caring about corruption in Washington — now that's a surprise to me. Is it because Gil himself managed to stay untarnished or do Minnesotans in general think, "Well, that doesn't happen to our politicians; that's someone else's problem"?

KG: It surprised me too. I think that the same was true across the country. Pollsters tell me that people are somewhat jaded, and believe that all politicians are somewhat corrupt. At the same time, people were very turned off by the hubris of the single party government. I do think that corruption was a symptom of the hubris.

LP: Okay, so why did Tim win? Did you expect him to win? If so, at what point in the campaign did you think it was possible? Did you ever reach the moment that you were absolutely certain he would win — that is, before the results were in?

KG: Tim won due to the right combination of strategy and external circumstances. He understood that he needed to hire a professional campaign manager and he did so, even though conventional wisdom said that a third tier candidate didn't hire someone of my level. He also made the decision to take a leave of absence in March and devote himself to the campaign. This is unusual in a third tier race and it required personal sacrifice by both him and Gwen.

He and I made a good team. We set our own agenda and ran the race on our terms, not in reaction to Gil. Conversely, Gil did not hire a professional campaign staff. He did not set any agenda, he in fact consistently responded to us. Gil would routinely respond to Tim in the media, which really helped us build name recognition.

When hiring consultants, we hired professional firms with lots of experience, who helped guide us. But we always followed our own star; we did not let consultants make decisions. Celinda Lake is a respected national pollster; she gave us an affordable rate because she liked us. We looked for a specific type of media firm — sole proprietor, with a principal who had a lot of campaign experience. If we chose a larger firm, a race our size would have been managed by a junior staffer.

We chose Blue Donkey and they were exactly the right firm for our race — aggressive and cost effective. We got first class consultants at bargain basement rates. In most cases, a first time candidate would be charged more than twice what we paid, because they would not know any better. Tim's investment in professional staff actually saved him money in the long term.

Tim captured the imagination of the media as the "every man" which got us national media when we weren't getting strong local media. This pushed the local media to cover us. Also, Tim was everywhere, which got us covered in the small papers.

The labor unions made the biggest difference for us. They got on board early, locally with manpower — they started door knocking in May! — and nationally with money. Their work and confidence helped us get other support.

Finally, the national movement to oust incumbents worked in our favor. I believe we could have won without it, but not by 6 points.

I would not have taken the job if I didn't believe we could win. Tim believed it as well. We knew it would take tremendous hard work and luck, but it was always possible. When did we know? By the final week, I would have been shocked if we didn't win. On Election Day, we were calm, cool and collected. We watched the results come in, knowing exactly where our vote was coming from and how well we needed to do in each precinct.

LP: Kerry, you've been very patient with my questions and lucid in your answers. This interview could go on for much longer — and maybe we'll cover more in the future — but it's time to come to a conclusion for now. Is there anything really important that was left out? Is there anything you want to say to the national media, for instance, that they may have missed?

KG: This race was not as much a long shot as people think. MN1 is a 50-50 district. It was always possible. It is also an inexpensive media district. What surprised me was how few people looked at this district objectively. I got it when I looked at the numbers and when I saw Tim interact with voters.

When the media and the parties rank races, they look at how much money a candidate has and how much press he/she is getting. MN1 was not on anyone's radar in February because Tim hadn't raised a lot of money and had banked almost nothing, and because he wasn't known and therefore not getting a lot of press. By his unorthodox hiring of me, he got some major fundraisers and national media to pay a bit of attention.

One critical factor that is not given much consideration is how well the candidate connects with voters. The trick is that you have to physically travel to the district to see it. It is the factor that makes the difference between the majority of candidates that are long shots and fail, and the minority that succeed. Labor unions, particularly AFSCME, spent the time and got it. The rank and file on the ground saw that this race was possible, and they studied the numbers and made an investment.

The national parties didn't get it until the very end. I'm a believer in Howard Dean's 50-state program; it really helped in the 1st. Our DNC staffer was excellent. I think that the DCCC should embrace this program and rely on it to be their rank and file on the ground — the person who can tell them if a congressional candidate has the right stuff to win. At the end, the DCCC came on board in a big way. The NRCC came on at the same point.

LP: Okay, I said the last question would be my last, but I lied — well, not really. I thought of two other things: (1) A lot of people don't know what Howard Dean's 50 state program is and how it differs from what went on before. Is it possible to briefly explain it?

(2) And this is what I really wanted to ask: What's next for you? Will you be coming back to run Tim's reelection campaign? Or will you be looking for a new "diamond in the rough" opportunity — another promising candidate in an overlooked district?

KG: Howard Dean's vision is to rebuild our party with a long-term view — we must be active in every state, not just the one's where we are already doing well. He has invested in putting people in "red districts" like MN1. We had Sarah Dueval. She is responsible for party building in MN1. She works with existing party activists and finds new ones where there is no party. There are many places in the US where the Democrats have simply ceased to play. Without Dean's vision and this strong election, we were in danger of becoming a regional party rather than a national one.

In MN1, Sarah made a big difference — it was like having another field staffer. In other districts, the return on the investment will be much longer term. This is causing some dissention in the Democratic Party — other leaders believe in putting all resources into those races that are our best chances of winning now. I think the dual strategy works well — some organizations work on short term, others on long.

I'm not sure what I'm doing. I lean toward working on an '08 presidential campaign, and I'm in discussions with a few campaigns. I'd also be very interested in managing the MN '08 Senate race; friends in the state are talking with two candidates on my behalf. I plan to make a decision soon after the first of the year, so I will be unavailable to return for Tim Walz's reelection bid.