The death of al-Zarqawi

by Tom Maertens

The administration is touting the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as yet another corner being turned in Iraq, and a great victory in the Global War on Terror.

There is no doubt that eliminating al-Zarqawi is a victory for our side. He was one of the organizers of the foreign terrorists in Iraq and had the charisma to raise money and attract support among radical Islamists. And since foreign jihadists are responsible for almost all the suicide bombs, ridding Iraq of one of the principal leaders of the foreign terrorists should reduce the number of such bombs.

Another positive aspect of this operation is that the coalition/Iraqi forces reportedly information from inside al-Zarqawi's organization. There was a $25 million reward on al-Zarqawi's head, which may have prompted the informant to come forward. We don't know the motivation of the informant yet, but it might turn out that he was disaffected by the random violence of the al-Zarqawi organization or was a paid informer for our side. In any case, it is very disruptive of secretive organizations such as terrorist cells to discover that there are elements of their group who are informing on them. That in itself might prove more disruptive of al-Zarqawi's organization that the elimination of its leader.

Al-Zarqawi was not the only foreign terrorist leader, but was one of the most prominent, mainly because of the publicity accorded him by the U.S. Most people had never heard of the Jordanian before our invasion of Iraq, and he was not initially a member of al-Qaeda. But he achieved some notoriety for kidnapping and executing Western hostages, and then for organizing suicide bombers.

Only after being demonized by the U.S. for those actions -- which is equivalent to being lionized among the jihadists -- did he hop on bin Laden's band wagon by publicly proclaiming his loyalty and subordination to al Qaeda. (It's worth remembering that Osama bin-Laden only became famous after the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on his camp in Afghanistan failed to kill him.) That served his purposes by affiliating his organization with the most prominent anti-U.S. terrorist organization, which would aid both recruitment and fund-raising.

That suited the U.S. purposes as well, because it allowed Bush and company to conflate the invasion of Iraq with the Global War on Terror. A trumped-up pre-emptive attack which created more terrorists than it eliminated could now be portrayed as retaliation against al Qaeda, the perpetrator of 9/11.

Al-Zarqawi's death may/may not reduce the number of suicide bombers, many of which randomly targeted Iraqi civilians -- to the point the his group was losing support among his fellow Sunnis -- but the recent increase in sectarian violence and organized criminal activity will more than compensate for the probably temporary reduction in violence while al-Zarqawi's oranization sorts out its leadership.

Recent surveys of morgues in the Baghdad area suggest that sectarian killing has gone up dramatically in the last few months. Shiite militias, working from inside government ministries, and Sunni insurgents are the main perpetrators. Organized criminal gangs are now apparently involved in the violence as well as they vie for control of parts of the city.

Al-Zarqawi will inevitably be replaced by one of his lieutenants, but perhaps one without the same charisma and organizational ability. Moreover, other insurgent groups are sure to arise that will proclaim themselves followers of the martyr al-Zarqawi. There is some reason to believe, in fact, that al-Zarqawi was actively seeking 'martrydom' for that reason.

So in the short term, this is a minor victory for the U.S., which the Bush administration will inevitably oversell, but in the longer term, it probably will have little impact on the outcome in Iraq.